Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
is used in Afghanistan in both a kinetic and non-kinetic manner. In Afghanistan where operations are spread across a vast area and the terrain creates challenges for other elements of joint fire support, kinetic effects from the air component is particularly important to support operations. Anti-Coalition Militants (ACM) are unable to negate the effects of kinetic airpower via direct means and have turned to indirect measures to attempt to limit its effectiveness. The ACM's indirect approach of inducing and exploiting civilian casualties has brought a great deal of negative attention regarding the use of kinetic airpower in Afghanistan. This negative attention has had the strategic effect of straining U.S. Afghan relations and forced the CENTCOM Commander to review kinetic airpower thus jeopardizing the use of this valuable asset in theater. This paper will address how the U.S. can balance the kinetic effects of airpower with strategic objectives in counterinsurgency.
BALANCING KINETIC EFFECTS OF AIRPOWER WITH COUNTERINSURGENCY OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN
In this type of war you cannot -you must not -measure the effectiveness of the effort by the number of bridges destroyed, buildings damaged, vehicles burned, or any of the other standards that have been used for regular warfare. The task is to destroy the effectiveness of the insurgent's efforts and his ability to use the population for his own ends. Taliban commander. In addition, the U.S. stated the operation resulted in 5-7 civilian deaths. 4 At the same time the U.S. was reporting these numbers; other organizations such as the U.N. claimed the civilian death toll was much higher. An official U.N.
statement claimed as many as 90 civilians were killed, of which 75 were women and children. 5 The international community and Afghan people were outraged as the details 119 Afghan civilians were killed in 12 airstrikes. 6 This increasing trend in civilian casualties has strained U.S. and Afghan relations and generated a great deal of negative media attention. Diplomatic tensions have risen to the point where the Afghan cabinet recently demanded negotiation of a more formal status of forces agreement to spell out combat authorities of foreign forces and to limit U.S. airstrikes in Afghanistan. 7 In addition, Afghan President Hamid Karzai in a November 2008 interview commented that if he could he would ground U.S. warplanes before they could inflict civilian casualties and destroy villages. 8 Beyond the issues of diplomatic tension and negative media attention, the increased number of airstrike related civilian casualties has had a negative effect on U.S. strategic objectives in the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight in Afghanistan. Is the correct course of action to withhold the kinetic effects of airpower by grounding warplanes as President Karzai suggests, or are the kinetic effects of airpower a key component of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and crucial to achieving U.S. strategic objectives in counterinsurgency? How do we balance the kinetic effects of airpower with U.S. strategic counterinsurgency objectives in Afghanistan?
To answer the question at hand, this paper will examine the importance of kinetic airpower in Afghanistan, key strategic objectives for counterinsurgency operations, the current application of kinetic airpower in theater, enemy counters to kinetic airpower and the effect kinetic airpower has had on U.S. counterinsurgency objectives. The paper will conclude with recommendations on how to balance the use of kinetic airpower with counterinsurgency objectives.
The Need for Airpower. U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and the Afghan operational environment drive requirements that make the availability and employment of kinetic airpower an essential part of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. A fundamental tenet of U.S. military employment is to apply combat power through combined arms action to achieve maximum effect. In particular, counterinsurgency operations require a combined arms approach emphasizing small-unit capabilities and information tasks. 9 Kinetic airpower is an important element of combined arms employment and its primary role in counterinsurgency operations is to provide fire support. "Fixed-wing aircraft's flexibility, range, speed, lethality, precision, and ability to mass at a desired time and place contribute significantly to overall joint fire support." 10 Joint fire support is a key enabler for military operations with the current U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan relies on small-unit operations and special operations forces (SOF). According to Army Field Manual 3-24, battalionsized and smaller unit operations are often most effective for countering insurgent activities. 11 By conducting small-unit operations, the U.S. assumes risk as the insurgents operate using a range of force size from employing as individuals to small units to massed forces. The counterinsurgent can never be certain when and where they will be engaged and the size of force they will encounter. As such, fire support is an important insurance policy in case a small coalition unit encounters a force superior in numbers or firepower. In addition, U.S. counterinsurgency strategy advocates that counterinsurgent forces must lighten their combat loads and enforce a habit of speed and mobility to gain maneuver parity with the lightly equipped insurgent. 12 A key enabler to lightening combat loads is access to fire support. 13 Airpower's flexibility and ability to mass at a desired time and place allow small and lightly equipped units to have more firepower for protection and maneuverability making it an ideal fire support element for these operations. square kilometers which makes it one and a half times larger than Iraq (roughly the size of Texas) and its population is sixteen percent larger than Iraq's population. 15 Its population distribution is twenty-three percent urban and seventy-seven percent rural. 16 The coalition has 70,350 troops in Afghanistan conducting counterinsurgency operations which is only forty-six percent the size of the force in Iraq. 17 Militants to weaken the control and legitimacy of the Afghani government while trying to increase their own control. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and thus needs to be the central focus for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. 18 The strategic center of gravity for counterinsurgency is the Afghan people 19 as their support and acceptance of either the insurgents or the counterinsurgents determines who wields the political power and who will ultimately control the country. Both the insurgent and counterinsurgents need and compete for support from the population to win and this is what Galula refers to as the first law of counterinsurgency warfare. 20 Thus, winning the support of the Afghan people is the strategic objective of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.
In counterinsurgency, support of the population not only means sympathy and approval of the people but also their active participation in the fight against insurgents. 21 Galula divides the population into three categories; the active minority for the cause, the neutral majority, and the active minority against the cause. His second law of counterinsurgency is to rely on the active minority that favors the counterinsurgents to influence the neutral majority so they eliminate or neutralize the minority that favors the insurgents. 22 The goal is to separate the insurgent from the population and to isolate them rendering them ineffective. All efforts in counterinsurgency operations need to keep this goal in mind. "First do no harm" must be the central consideration. 23 Collateral damage and civilian casualties is the number one cause of friction in this crucial relationship. Any operation or action that hurts the counterinsurgent's relationship with the favorable minority and the neutral majority will have negative effects on the strategic objective and the ability to win.
Insurgents have an asymmetric advantage over the counterinsurgents in the fight for popular support as the insurgents live and move freely among the people. This gives them access which makes separating them from the population difficult. To separate the insurgents from the population, counterinsurgents have to focus operations and efforts in four key areas; security, governance, services and legitimacy. The government has to apply national power in the political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure fields and disciplines to be dominant in these key areas.
The counterinsurgents must dominate the key areas, provide the population with basic needs and address their grievances to separate and isolate the insurgents from the population.
Security is the starting point and cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations. 24 The people's first concern is physical security from crime and the insurgency. In
Afghanistan this task is primarily a function of coalition forces in coordination with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The three pillars of the current U.S. Afghan security strategy are to continue combat operations, operate provincial reconstruction teams, and equip and train the ANA and ANP. 25 The goal of the security strategy is not only to remove the insurgent from the population but to provide an environment where governance takes hold and the government can provide the people basic services such as power, water, roads and medical care to name a few.
When an area gains physical security, the Afghan government is able to address the peoples' grievances and to institute positive and permanent reforms that benefit the people. Locally defined legitimacy is coin of the realm. 26 As the government advances in these areas, they increase their legitimacy with the local population and further separate the insurgents from the people. Security is the key enabler that sets the stage for government legitimacy and allows the government to focus on the people. "Without physical security for the people, a COIN campaign is going nowhere useful, no matter how sophisticated its doctrine or well coordinated its centrally civilian-directed efforts." 27 Counterinsurgencies are won at the strategic level. 28 In the interdiction role, kinetic airpower is employed against fixed targets that are planned in depth prior to execution. This allows the crew to plan execution with the benefit of intelligence and a detail collateral damage estimate. In this mode of operation airpower is used as shaping fires to support ground operations or part of an air campaign to target high interest target sets. In the dynamic targeting role, kinetic airpower is employed against either a fixed or mobile target and the tasking timeline does not afford the crew time to plan in depth prior to execution. Rough planning, intelligence and a collateral damage estimate are generated by the Air Operation Center (AOC) and passed to the crew as they are en route to the target. In this role airpower is used to target theater high value and high payoff targets. Finally, in the close air support role, kinetic airpower is employed against a variety of target types based on the fire support requirements generated by the ground force commander. Fires are not preplanned but are coordinated as the operation or battle unfolds so intelligence for the target is very limited and aircrew must use a field generated collateral damage estimates for execution.
Kinetic airpower provides the ground force commander with precision fires and scalable effects for close air support. Based on aircraft weapons loads, the GFC has a sliding scale of fire effects he can apply to the tactical situation. If he is supported by an asymmetry has proven to be a powerful psychological weapon to attack ACM morale. 33 ACM are scared of airpower's strike capability and this has driven their strategy so as to avoid airpower and to find ways to marginalize it. 34 The Anti-Coalition Militants are unable to counter the effects of kinetic airpower with force on force application so they have turned to asymmetric means to counter the impact kinetic airpower has had in the counterinsurgency fight.
ACM Counters to Airpower. Kinetic airpower is a special target singled out by the enemy to nullify its effects. 35 Anti-Coalition Militants use a variety asymmetric approaches to take away the coalition's kinetic airpower asymmetric advantage. The insurgent's goal is to either render kinetic airpower ineffective or to shape a situation to where its effects are negative thus creating an environment where the coalition is forced to withhold the use of kinetic airpower. This is done through actions that drive a wedge between the counterinsurgent and the population so as to diminish the people's support for the government. It forces the coalition to consider withholding kinetic airpower in order to preserve the strategic objective of winning the support of the Afghan people.
The ways ACM set conditions to drive this phenomenon is by forcing an overreaction, complicating the targeting problem and employing propaganda.
Often insurgents will take an action or conduct an operation with the primary purpose of eliciting an overreaction from counterinsurgent forces. 36 Their goal is to benefit from the second and third-order effects of the coalition's overreaction. By creating a situation where coalition forces have to commit kinetic airpower, they hope to cause either collateral damage/casualties or create a perception that the coalition forces are heavy-handed and cruel. This creates a David versus Goliath type image in the media and population which drives sympathy towards the insurgents. 37 The short-term effect of using kinetic airpower may gain military advantage but the long-term effect will be counterproductive if the action turns popular sentiment against the coalition.
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A complimentary tactic to forcing an overreaction is complicating the targeting problem. Anti-Coalition Militants complicate the coalition's targeting problem by engaging coalition forces in urban areas while in the presence of civilians. This levels the playing field for the insurgent as coalition forces are not able to take full advantage of its superior firepower, speed and mobility as it would in open terrain. 39 Urban areas complicate airpower's ability to find, fix, and finish targets due to the cluttered environment and collateral damage and casualty concerns. A common insurgent tactic in Afghanistan is to occupy a house in a village and then engage coalition forces from that position with civilians in the vicinity. 40 Another tactic is to mix in with the population while trying to evade coalition forces. Both these tactics create a win-win situation for the insurgent with respect to airpower. As the insurgents use human shields it forces the coalition to withhold kinetic airpower to avoid civilian casualties thus negating airpower. If the coalition does not withhold kinetic airpower, the resulting civilian casualties provide the insurgent with a huge propaganda event to leverage as a means to pull public support from the coalition and Afghan government.
Insurgents use propaganda to put a negative spin on the kinetic effects of airpower in order to ban the weapon they fear the most. ACM in Afghanistan are waging information warfare as much as combat. 41 They try to turn encounters with coalition forces into situations where collateral damage and casualties become an issue so they can exploit the situation in the media and in the population. Propaganda is such an effective tool for them that they are willing to ensure civilian casualties as a standard propaganda method 42 . Civilian Casualties. Of all the issues that emerge during counterinsurgency operations, collateral damage and civilian casualties is the one that attracts the most negative and immediate attention from the media and population. This is particularly true of collateral damage and civilian casualties caused by airstrikes. The driving factor behind this is that when kinetic airpower is the vector, casualty numbers tend to be high due to the lethality and destructive power of the air instrument and the local perception that using airpower against small numbers of insurgents is heavy-handed. The increasing trend in civilian casualty related airstrikes must be stopped.
Civilian casualties outrage the very people the coalition is trying to protect, fuels the insurgent's propaganda machine, and turns members of the favorable active minority and neutral majority into insurgents. For every ACM we kill we have the potential of replace them with five more as discontent and a cycle of revenge is established. A balance must be struck between the use of kinetic airpower to meet tactical and operational needs and the strategic objective of counterinsurgency to win the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan.
Balancing Kinetic Effects
Kinetic airpower is a key and essential tool for the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. The coalition cannot ignore the effects civilian casualty related airstrikes have on the attainment of their strategic objective in counterinsurgency. A balance must be struck between the military objective at the tactical and operational level versus the political objective at the strategic level because counterinsurgency wars are won at the strategic level. That being said, "…we need to be careful lest we overbalance away from according the military dimension its proper due" 54 as security is the key enabler for other functions of counterinsurgency and the Afghan people's top concern. To balance the kinetic effects of airpower with counterinsurgency objectives in Afghanistan and guarantee its continued use, the coalition needs to employ a three prong approach. Once the investigation is complete, the coalition and Afghan government should provide adequate and timely compensation to the victims. It is paramount that our actions show the Afghan people how deeply we care when property and lives are lost as a result of counterinsurgency operations and that we investigate to ensure we avoid such events in the future.
Information Warfare Campaign. The third step is to wrap all our efforts to balance the kinetic effects of airpower in an information campaign. Information is the strategically decisive front in counterinsurgency and we need to use information operations to divide and conquer. 56 The information campaign must target the correct audience, establish primary vectors to communicate the message, shape the battlespace and communicate the message in a timely manner.
The primary audience in the counterinsurgency is the Afghan people. They are the ones who make up the active minorities and neutral majorities the coalition is trying to influence. They are the ones who will determine the winner of this conflict. All messages must be crafted and targeted with our strategic objectives relative to them in mind. All other audiences such as the international community, the U.S., and the insurgents take a back seat to the Afghan people in this war. Although support from the other audiences is important, it is not as paramount as the Afghan audience.
The coalition should use all vectors at its disposal to communication its message to the Afghan public but based on Afghan culture and media capabilities, there are three primary mean that will be more effective than others and must be exploited; village elders, tribal relations, and radio. With seventy-seven percent of the people located in the rural areas and based on their culture and strong tribal/family ties, Afghanis are very village and tribal centric in daily life. 57 In 2008, the second most popular mean of receiving information about events occurring in Afghanistan was through friends, families and neighbors. 58 The coalition needs to leverage this fact and to set up a in Afghanistan is radio with eighty-four percent of the Afghan population having a radio in the house. 59 The coalition should target local and international radio stations with reach into Afghanistan. For international stations, the coalition should target BBC World
Radio as it has one of the largest listener bases in Afghanistan and the people trust information broadcast by that service. 60 The coalition should also target sources such as print media and television, but with a national literacy rate of twenty-eight percent 61 and a television ownership rate of thirty-eight percent 62 ; these vectors will not have the reach of the other three aforementioned vectors.
The coalition needs to shape the battlespace in order to make its message more effective and to help propagate it through the Afghan population. The way they can do this is by preparing the population for negative events and by decreasing the time required to execute the information decision cycle or OODA loop 63 .
To prepare the population for negative events before they occur, the coalition should brief the media and public on the kinetic airpower target process and issues as well as on measures used to minimize civilian casualties while highlighting the insurgent's disregard for Afghan lives. This will show that the coalition makes every effort to preserve Afghan lives so if civilian casualties occur during an airstrike the public will be sensitized to that fact. 64 While it is important for the coalition to insure accuracy in information before release it is just as important to release it in a timely manner so it is relevant. The coalition must take measures to decrease its information OODA loop. The coalition can achieve this with the help of airstrike initial field investigations but the other key is not to wait to release information until they have the complete solution. The coalition needs to make incremental media releases and to be candid and transparent with the information available. The worst thing the coalition can do is to be silent. If they are silent they create the perception that they are hiding negative information and their legitimacy will suffer.
Finally, the coalition needs to increase the amount of information it provides the public on insurgent atrocities and their tactics of using human shields to avoid airstrikes.
If insurgent actions cost or put civilian lives in jeopardy during an airstrike, the coalition should highlight that fact but not overtly use it to legitimize the actions taken by the coalition. They should focus on insurgent actions and their lack of regard for the Afghan people. To make this message credible they should put an Afghani face on the issue by interviewing the victims and letting them tell their story of how the ACM precipitated the civilian casualties. The coalition should also make every effort to give media access to the locations of these events to the point of providing transportation if it is in a remote area. Transparency is key in this area and putting and an Afghani face on the information being delivered will help it resonate with the Afghan public.
In the end, the Azizabad operation was an informational and strategic failure.
After a second investigation was conducted into the 22 August 2008 airstrike by USAF Brigadier General Michael Callan, the U.S. revised its casualty number to report 22 ACM and 33 civilians were killed, of which 3 were woman and 12 were children. The inability to balance the kinetic effects of airpower with the strategic counterinsurgency objective was the route case of the Azizabad failure.
Conclusion
Kinetic airpower is a valuable tool in the Combatant Commander's and ground force commander's toolkit. Measures must be taken to balance the kinetic effects of airpower with the strategic counterinsurgency object or we will lose this valuable tool in the fight against the insurgents, but more importantly, we will lose the strategic fight in Afghanistan. Balance is crucial and we must work to achieve it immediately.
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